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SUITABILITY OF THE UNDERLYING THEORIES OF 
ZEALOUS ADVOCACY IN ENSURING JUSTICE: LAYING THE 
GROUND TO LOOK BEYOND THE ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 
LITON CHANDRA BISWAS* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Despite the dissatisfaction, distrust, and to some extent, abhorrence of a 
considerable number of people, the zealous advocacy, without leaving any 
space to any alternative model, has been playing the dominant role in the 
adversary jurisdictions and “thoroughly dominates our thinking about legal 
problem solving.”  Surprisingly, however, the overwhelming trust on, and 
bias towards, ZA are not based on any concrete justification.  Rather, the 
system is, to a certain extent, based on some unexamined theories.  The 
purpose of this Article is to examine the strength, correctness, or the 
suitability of these theories with the concept of justice.  This examination 
will confirm whether there is any justification of the exclusive application 
of the ZA model, irrespective of the nature of legal problems, in all cases, 
even in the cases where the model completely fails and leads to tragedy. 
This Article examines four broader theories: (1) Lawyers play an 
avoidable role in the process of decision making by the courts and the 
judicial system, which takes the decision; (2) A lawyer’s duty to the client 
is equal or superior to his or her duty to the court; (3) Oppositional 
presentation mechanism is the best way to reveal the truth; and (4) OPM is 
the best model to protect democratic values and to ensure accurate 
remedies.  Detailed discussion of these theories reveals the incorrectness 
and inappropriateness of these theories to the purpose of justice.  In 
consequence, the attempts to modify or to replace the zealous advocacy are 
justified, and it creates an opportunity to look into the alternative models 
which are likely to be more effective. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Anglo-American jurisdictions, lawyers employ all of their skills and 
knowledge to serve the interests of their respective clients at any cost.  This 
attitude of the lawyers is popularly known as zealous advocacy (“ZA”).  
However, there is an everlasting dispute as to the acceptability of ZA; the 
positive and negative aspects of ZA have been on the discussion table for 
more than a century.  In an attempt to contribute to the dispute and 
understanding of the effect of the application of ZA, this Article begins with 
the depiction of two scenarios. 
A.  ZEALOUS ADVOCACY SCENARIO NUMBER ONE 
Twenty-year-old Natasha is a very well-behaved, calm, and rational 
young woman who comes from a financially backward family.  Twenty-
five-year-old Jhony is, on the contrary, a rude, cruel, and aggressive young 
man from a rich and influential family.  Every day, Jhony stalks and teases 
Natasha on her way to class.  On several occasions, Natasha and her family 
have brought the issue to the attention of the local authorities and have 
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requested measures for her safety.  However, nothing can stop the notorious 
Jhony, as his father, an influential person, saves him every time.  One day, 
Jhony, along with his four friends, kidnap Natasha.  They take turns 
continuously raping her for two days, following which they brutally assault 
her and then throw her on the highway.  Later, she is rescued and charges of 
kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder are brought against the suspects. 
Jhony retains Mr. Jadal as his defense attorney.  As far as the “concept 
of zealous advocacy”1 is concerned, the lawyer and the accused must be in 
a trusting relationship and have the understanding that the lawyer does not 
need to know anyone but his client, whom he should represent zealously.2  
According to this concept, Mr. Jadal holds the duty to save his client at any 
cost, and, in doing so, he is permitted to use any means the client can 
afford.3  The dominant view dictates that in order to prove the innocence, 
justness, and inculpability of his client, Mr. Jadal can humiliate and 
stigmatize the victim and her witnesses.  In the process of stigmatizing the 
victim, he can use every offensive, scandalous, and nasty weapon 
 
1.  The “concept of zealous advocacy” or “zealous advocacy” or “zealous advocacy model” 
are hereinafter referred to as “ZA.” 
2. Michael Asimow & Richard Weisberg, When the Lawyer Knows the Client is Guilty: 
Client Confessions in Legal Ethics, Popular Culture, and Literature, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
229, 235 (2009); Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1319, 1322 (2006) (quoting Lord Brougham who in Queen Caroline’s Case [1820] stated: “[a]n 
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his 
client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other 
persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he 
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.”). 
3. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME 
J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 209, 271 (2006) (“The duty of zealous representation calls for the 
attorney to use all legal means to obtain a favorable outcome for the client, which can include 
using tactics that lead a jury to conclude mistakenly that the person is not guilty of the offense, 
because the government has not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . ‘Indeed, 
the prevailing view is that the lawyer is ethically required to do so.’”) (quoting MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 226 (3d ed. 2004)); Stephen 
McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General 
Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 315, 315 (1991) (“Acting as an 
advisor, the lawyer certainly may, and arguably must, provide her clients with complete and 
accurate advice, even when she reasonably believes that doing so will cause them to withhold or 
suppress evidence.  In litigation, the lawyer’s obligations of zeal and confidentiality require or 
permit her to engage in a host of dubious activities: withholding evidence, even when the resulting 
record is radically incomplete; presenting documents or testimony that she believes, based on 
information unavailable to the tribunal, to be false; discrediting through cross-examination 
witnesses she knows to be truthful; and arguing for inferences from the evidence that she knows 
are unwarranted.”); United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in part) (positing that a lawyers in his normal course of action “can confuse a 
witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive.” Justice 
White further states that defense counsel will cross examine and impeach a prosecution witness, 
even if he or she knows that the witness is telling the truth); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind 
of Hearing,  123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1317 (1975); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 
STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1951) (stating that a lawyer should lie for the interest of his or her client). 
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imaginable so that the victim loses her moral strength and fails to 
effectively present her case.4  Consequently, the government (indirectly, the 
victim) loses the case and is prevented from receiving the assurance of 
justice, which is the sole purpose of law.5 
B.  ZEALOUS ADVOCACY SCENARIO NUMBER TWO 
Harry, a young, energetic man and a devotee of democracy, organizes a 
peaceful and non-violent demonstration with the support of a mass of 
people to get rid of a dictatorial and tyrannical regime led by Douglas.  The 
movement, aimed at establishing democracy, is intensifying day by day.  To 
suppress the movement, the dictator, Douglas, with the help of his own 
supporters, brings violence to an otherwise non-violent movement, which 
leads to the death of innocent people.  Although neither Harry nor any 
supporter of that movement is involved in the deaths of those innocent 
people, he is arrested and charged with murder.  Despite oppositional 
pressure from the government, lawyers driven by strong professionalism, 
adversarialism, and democratic value spontaneously come forward to 
defend Harry.  Following the rules of ZA, the lawyers with the utmost 
dedication to justice are succeeding to rebut the fabricated statements of the 
government witnesses. 
In order to take control of the case, Douglas threatens Harry, stating 
that if Harry does not confess, his wife and children will be killed.6  To save 
his beloved family, Harry falsely confesses in court.  However, Harry’s 
lawyer, honoring the principles of ZA, continues to defend him.  Finally, 
Harry’s lawyer who is inspired by Lord Brougham, fights against Douglas 
with the infinite power of ZA and succeeds in defending his client’s case. 
Both of the cases depict the immense strength and influence of ZA.  
While the first case shows the immediate danger of ZA’s strength in 
obstructing the path of justice, the second case shows its role in making the 
path of justice smooth.  To deal with the irregularities in the application of 
ZA, numerous legal researches have argued in favor and against the system.  
The opponents, predominantly media, popular culture, and scholarly 
accounts based on general ethics, as opposed to legal ethics, have been 
 
4. Nancy E. Snow, Evaluating Rape Shield Laws: Why the Law Continues to Fail Rape 
Victims, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE, 252 (Keith 
Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999). 
5.  Although there is a debate as to the theory that the purpose of law is to ensure justice, for 
the purpose of this Article the theory is considered as true. 
6.  Apart from facing a threat, innocent people may, mistakenly or for other reasons, confess 
that they are guilty.  See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 
HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (1975). 
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making an extreme effort to depict the shortcomings and inherent dangers 
of ZA, whereas ZA advocates have been making efforts to defend it at any 
cost.7  Despite the strong arguments for either side, a lawyer’s utmost zeal 
to protect the interest of his clients has been the fundamental principle of 
the adversary system,8 and the same has been considered as the “the 
dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.”9  Despite the dissatisfaction, 
distrust, and to some extent, abhorrence of a considerable amount of people, 
ZA, without leaving any space to the alternative models, has been playing 
the dominant role in adversary jurisdictions and “thoroughly dominates our 
thinking about legal problem solving.”10 
Surprisingly, however, the overwhelming trust on, and bias towards, 
ZA are not based on any concrete justification.  Rather, to a certain extent, 
the system is based on several unexamined theories. The purpose of this 
Article is to examine the strength, correctness, and suitability of these 
theories in terms of the concept of justice.  This examination will confirm 
whether there is any justification for the exclusive application of the ZA 
model, irrespective of the nature of the legal problem, in all cases, including 
when the model fails completely and leads to tragedy, such as in the first 
case discussed previously.11  To this end, the Article examines four broad 
theories that lay the foundation of ZA, and later reveals that the theories are 
not suitable for the purpose of justice.  Consequently, attempts to modify or 
replace ZA are justified, and these attempts create opportunities to look into 
 
7. Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 248-53 (depicting the negative perception of ZA in 
popular culture); Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the 
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954 (2000) (pointing to a popular belief that “[l]awyers are 
an avaricious lot who will bleed you dry”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the 
Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 6 (1996) 
(stating that the adversary system is not only inadequate, but also dangerous); Samuel D. 
Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests that Outweigh Confidentiality, 5 J. LEG. PROF. 
5, 7 (1980) (depicting the attitude of the common people as to the zealous rule stating that “[i]n 
explaining to a layman the professional responsibilities of a lawyer one encounters almost 
immediately the enigma of the adversary system, often referred to as the ‘sporting’ or ‘contest’ 
system.  How can you defend a person you know is guilty?  How can you justify one-sided 
presentation if truth is the goal?  Is not the search for truth subordinated to winning the law suit?  
Is it not the duty of an attorney to do everything possible to further the client’s cause?  Is the 
lawyer merely a hired gun, a mouthpiece, a hired brain and voice?  Is the system anything other 
than a modern reflection of man’s inherent combative nature, a pageant necessitating professional 
apology?”).  But cf.id. (On the other hand, supporters of ZA believe that the rule is “the best 
guaranty against the premature and biased decisions.”); Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory 
of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. 1639, 1644 (2015) (stating that the supporters of ZA believe that it 
plays an important role in advancing “human dignity, autonomy, due process rights, and clients’ 
trust and confidence in their lawyers”). 
8. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at 1319. 
9. Id. 
10. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 25. 
11.  See supra Section I.A. 
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the alternative models that are likely to be more effective.  To utilize that 
opportunity, this Article explores beyond the ZA model. 
II.  ZA THEORIES 
Numerous theories are credited for the dominance and survival of ZA 
in Anglo-American jurisdictions.  These unexamined theories justify the 
immense importance of ZA in ensuring justice and democratic values.  
Thus, it may be said that the validity of ZA is subject to the validity of these 
theories.  Consequently, in order to determine the acceptability or necessity 
of ZA, these theories must first be examined.  Therefore, this Article 
examines numerous interrelated theories. 
A.  THEORY NUMBER ONE: RESTRICTED INFLUENCE ON THE  ACTIONS 
 OF LAWYERS - THE “SYSTEM DOES IT ALL” 
Consciously or unconsciously, the promoters of ZA assume that the 
consequences of lawyers’ actions in ensuring justice are very limited.  They 
point to the fact that the direct course of action of lawyers is filtered through 
the system and that, at the end, a neutral judge makes the decision.  ZA 
proponents, therefore, assume that lawyers merely play a secondary or 
indirect role in the decision-making process within the justice system.  
According to this theory, the system plays the primary or direct role in 
upholding justice and should, therefore, be allowed to make all decisions.12  
Thus, despite being an integral part of the system, lawyers are separate from 
it, especially in terms of the purposes that lawyers and the system aim to 
serve.13  For example, one scholar is of the opinion that “[f]inding the truth 
is the object of the judicial system, but it is not the governing principle for 
the lawyer.”14  Therefore, the voice of the system is different than the voice 
of the lawyers. 
This theory is presumed to be incorrect, as it is unquestionably true that 
lawyers play the most important and influential role in the adversary 
system.  This presumption can be confirmed if one understands the power a 
lawyer has over a case.  While traditional accounts assume that the judicial 
system plays the main role in the decision-making process, the direct role of 
lawyers in the formulation of that decision has been overlooked.  Unlike the 
 
12. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 9 (“[M]y job as a lawyer is not to judge the rights and 
wrong of the client or the cause; it is to defend as best I can my client’s interests. . . . [T]rial is the 
mechanism by which we determine in our society whether or not the person is in fact guilty.”). 
13. Duncan Webb, Are Lawyers Regulatable?, 45 ALTA. L. REV. 233, 244 (2008) (“Lawyers 
are not the arbiters of justice — that is the role of the courts.  While lawyers undeniably play an 
important role in the judicial process, they are simply assistants to the court.”). 
14. Henning, supra note 3, at 214. 
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previously-described theory, the voices of the judicial system and of the 
judges are at times or “most of the time,”15 intermingled with, or influenced 
by, the voice of the lawyers.  Lawyers can successfully mislead the court 
and can affect the probability of winning a case.16  Sometimes judges do not 
make their own decisions; instead, they make decisions based on what 
lawyers want them to decide and, thus, lawyers are able to manipulate 
judgments.17  In addition, it is important to not overlook the fact that there 
are incompetent, or less competent, judges who are unable to stand up 
against the fame of good lawyers, and, therefore, decide cases in favor of 
those lawyers to minimize the risk of appeal.18  The overwhelming 
importance of lawyers in the courts’ decision-making process is nicely 
reduced into writing as follows: 
[L]awyers are often—maybe usually—more than just legal 
technicians.  They shape deals and they make law. They invent 
new forms of social life, they fill gaps, resolve conflicts and 
ambiguities.  They mold the law, through the process of legal 
argument, in court, in briefs, in negotiations.19 
In brief, borrowing the words of William Rich, it can appropriately be 
said that “legal rules are designed to be administered by lawyers.”20  
Because lawyers play the most important and influential role in the 
functioning of the judicial system, it cannot be expected that the system 
 
15. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or 
Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 136 (2001). 
16. Elisabetta Iossa & Bruno Jullien, The Market for Lawyers and Quality LawSyers in Legal 
Services, 43 RAND J. ECON. 677, 680 (2012).  Scholars Fuller and Randall rightly argue that a 
lawyer “plays his role badly, and trespasses against the obligations of professional responsibility, 
when his desire to win [to further his or her client’s interest] leads him to muddy the headwaters 
of decision.”  See David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 677 (2012) (reviewing 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010)) (quoting LON L. FULLER & 
JOHN D. RANDALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, 44 
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-62 (1958)). 
17. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 15, at 136-37 (“Most of the time, most judges consider the 
competing legal meanings offered by the lawyers in a case and simply adopt one, albeit generally 
with some modification, as that court’s official interpretation of the law. . . . And even when a 
judge adopts her own interpretation, because lawyers frame the questions courts decide, the 
lawyers will still have significantly influenced the law-building process, a role that extends far 
beyond a particular client’s case.”); MICHAEL HEAD & SCOTT MANN, LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: 
ETHICS, SOCIETY AND CRITICAL THINKING 1, 8 (2d ed., 2008) (“Particular defenders and 
prosecutors have achieved great fame and fortune effectively manipulating judges and juries 
through clever use of fallacious arguments”). 
18. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 15, at 136-37; HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8. 
19. Duncan Kennedy, The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes, 18 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (1987). 
20. William Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, BYU L. REV. 767, 783 (1980). 
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would serve any purpose other than that of the lawyers; the voice of the 
justice system is liable to be undermined by the voice of the lawyers. 
To defend the theory that the “system does it all,” advocates prescribe a 
second theory.  The belief is that, at the end of the day, the voice of the 
system will prevail because the opposing lawyer will neutralize or negate 
the influence of his or her counterpart by using zeal.21  Accordingly, 
Freedman justifies Lord Brougham’s position of extreme zeal in Queen 
Caroline’s Case, by positing that zeal is not prejudicial to justice as “[t]here 
is also an advocate on the other side and an impartial judge and/or jury 
sitting over both.”22  The belief regarding the neutralization or negation of 
lawyers’ influence during trial is based on a third theory that lawyers in 
conflict are equally equipped and are of equal standard, ensuring balance 
during trial and convenience for the judicial system to make its own neutral 
decisions.23 
Generally, this theory is not correct because, in practice, lawyers have a 
varying capacity for reasoning, aptitude, and competence, which results in 
parties not being on equal footing during trial.24  Factors such as legal 
education, training, money, political influence, “natural barriers,”25 are 
responsible for the variance.26  It is common for graduates from elite law 
schools to be elite lawyers, whereas the graduates of “lower tier” law 
schools are likely to be average, below average, or “storefront” lawyers.27  
Similarly, training from, or affiliation with, large and reputable law firms 
tends to produce highly competent and sophisticated lawyers.28 
In addition, as Hadfield convincingly proves, “natural barriers” are 
immensely responsible for the significant variance in levels of competence 
 
21. Wasserstrom, supra note 6, at 10. 
22. Monroe H. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, 2 J. 
LEG. PROF. 47, 48 (1977); see also id. at 8-9 (assuming that opposing counsel has the ability to 
“highlight, explain and refute such fallacious argument”); HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8-9 
(assuming that opposing counsel has the ability to “highlight, explain and refute such fallacious 
argument”). 
23.  United States v. Wade 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (positing that a true adversary system deserves that both parties at trial are on 
an equal footing); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22 (“In an ideal and abstracted form, the 
adversary system clearly contemplates adversaries of equal skill and economic support. . . .”). 
24. CLIFF ROBERSON & DILIP K. DAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
MODELS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 34 (2008). 
25. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 989 (A “natural barrier” means the barrier humans are born 
into that affects “the underlying capacity of a particular individual to absorb and engage in a given 
form of reasoning.”). 
26. See generally Hadfield, supra note 7, at 972-94. 
27. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 990. 
28. Id. 
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among lawyers from similar tiers of law schools and law firms.29  
Consequently, a lawyer with fewer natural barriers than his or her 
counterpart has a higher possibility of winning a case irrespective of the fact 
that both have academic and training experience of similar standards.  Other 
relevant theories which claim that there is no best solution to legal 
problems,30 that law is extensively complex,31 or that lawyers should aim 
for winning at all costs,32 make the situation of unequal training and 
experience even more complicated.  These theories authorize a competent 
lawyer to craft the web of arguments so wonderfully, and to such an 
extreme extent, that he or she can make a castle in the air, and thus, win a 
meritless case only by his or her personal competence.33  As a result, the 
interest of the party having a more competent lawyer usually prevails over 
the interest of the party with a less competent lawyer, and in this process the 
judge would likely decide in favor of the party having the highly competent 
lawyer.  Therefore, it is worthwhile to quote a recent observation: 
[H]iring a certified lawyer generates a decision-bias effect: 
incompetent judges bias their decisions in favor of certified 
lawyers, due to their reputational concerns. . . . Incompetent judges 
then bias their decisions in favor of certified lawyers in order to 
minimize the risk of appeals from certified lawyers and thus the 
inference about their ability. . . . [H]igh-quality lawyers are able to 
‘influence’ the trial outcome, by raising the chance of finding 
evidence favorable to their case.34 
In this reality, Rich cannot resist asking, “what happens to our concept 
of justice if results really do hinge on the competence of the advocate and 
not on the merits of the case?”35  It is not difficult to answer this question.  
The cases’ outcomes, at least from a theoretical perspective, are in favor of 
the parties that can afford to hire high-quality lawyers.36  Hiring a high-
 
29. Id.  Menkel-Meadow’s observation in this regard is the same in that “even if we 
equalized economic resources, an inequality in raw, legal talent might still exist in many cases.”  
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 39. 
30. Webb, supra note 13, at 239 (“Given the nature of legal problems and their practical 
context, it can be shown that it is impossible distinguish between best solutions – even assuming 
there is one.”). 
31. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 995-96. 
32. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8. 
33. Rich, supra note 20, at 781 (emphasis added) (stating that “the lawyer’s competence and 
effectiveness make a difference”). 
34. Iossa & Jullien, supra note 16, at 678-79. 
35. Rich, supra note 20, at 781. 
36. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 956 (indicating that parties having more resources 
overwhelmingly win cases); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22 (“In litigation, the unequal 
resources of the parties will often determine the hierarchy of opposition.”). 
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quality lawyer involves elevated legal costs and, consequently, financially 
unprepared individuals fail to hire lawyers who can win most cases.37  
Thus, the legal system “chooses the management of the economy over the 
justice of social and political relationships as its central preoccupation.”38  
Therefore, it would be no exaggeration to say that in access to justice, the 
practice of law, extracted through liberal market economy, creates alarming 
discrimination between the rich and the poor.  Observing this situation, 
Rich expresses his disappointment that “[f]or the wealthy [law] connotes 
justice; for the poor it creates apprehension.”39 
Therefore, in order to ensure justice to all, case decisions must not be 
dependent upon the resources, skills, or competence of the lawyers “but on 
the merits of the argument.”40  And, in order to avoid lawyers’ dominance 
over the law and over the merit of cases, they must not be allowed to use 
their competence for any purpose other than the purpose of the system 
itself.  Thus, the legal system’s key player, the lawyer, must speak in the 
same voice as that of the system; his or her purpose and the purpose of the 
system must be the same.  Consequently, lawyers’ actions and the rationale 
of those actions cannot be in any circumstance prejudicial to the concept of 
justice; instead ensuring and promoting justice should be the sole 
justification of lawyers’ actions.41 Justice Bokhary nicely states that the 
purpose of law is justice, whereas the duty of lawyers is to serve this 
purpose: “The pursuit of justice is the vocation of all lawyers, and every 
worthwhile landmark of the law has been built upon this idea.”42  Thus, the 
present theory, i.e., the “system does it all,” appears to be incorrect.  
Consequently, lawyers’ actions are required to be in conformity with either 
 
37. Iossa & Jullien, supra note 16, at 679; Rich, supra note 20, at 780 (stating that “[T]he 
high price of professional litigation has driven a large segment of the middle income population 
away from the courts.”). 
38. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 1000. 
39. Rich, supra note 20, at 780.  In this point, Kennedy seems more disappointed.  He 
observes: 
At present, the distribution of legal services is a disgrace: rich people get vastly more 
than they need or deserve; middle income people can’t afford a lawyer in numerous 
situations in which they are ripped off for relatively small amounts of money, or 
discriminated against on sexual or racial grounds, or seriously injured.  Poor people 
have virtually no access to legal services, given the abysmal underfunding of the Legal 
Services Corporation. 
Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1162. 
40. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 22-23. 
41. J. D. Heydon, Reciprocal Duties of Bench and Bar, 81 AUST. LAW J. 23, 26 (2007) 
(citing Beavis v. Dawson, (1957) 1 QB 195, at 201 (Eng.) (Singleton LJ considers lawyer as the 
helper in the administration of justice)). 
42. Bokhary P. J., Justice and the Law: The Evolving Role of the Lawyer, 34 H.K. L.J. 133, 
133 (2004). 
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the system or the law.  To end the discussion on this theory, it is worthwhile 
to quote Kennedy: 
You [addressing the lawyers] bear responsibility when your unique 
way of molding the law, your work product, wins out to the 
detriment of the community, even if it was not you, but a judge or 
administrator who “pulled the trigger,” so to speak, by actually 
deciding the case, and even if someone else would have done it if 
you didn’t.43 
B.  THEORY NUMBER TWO: A LAWYER’S DUTY TO THE  CLIENT IS 
 EQUAL OR SUPERIOR TO HIS OR HER DUTY TO  THE COURT 
Along with others, lawyers predominantly play two key roles: (1) 
lawyers serve or represent clients with zeal and (2) lawyers serve the law or 
act as an “officer of the court.”44  Proponents of ZA assume that the law 
does not specifically prescribe which role will prevail when the two 
conflict; therefore, zealous representation is justified until such zeal is not 
prejudicial to the balancing of these two duties.45  The following words 
exactly depicts the situation: 
Existing theories of legal ethics contain an important and largely 
unexamined assumption—that lawyers are simultaneously capable 
of partisanship on behalf of clients while remaining sufficiently 
objective to ensure that their own conduct is ethical.  This 
assumption, which is referred to here as the objective-partisan 
assumption, can be found in all of the leading theories of legal 
ethics.46 
 
43. Kennedy, supra note 19, at 1161. 
44. Trevor C.W. Farrow, Sustainable Professionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 51, 69-70 
(2008); David A. Demers, The Continuum of Professionalism, 28 STETSON L. REV. 319, 319 
(1998) (As an “officer of the court,” a lawyer’s duty is highly uncertain.  However, for the 
purpose of this Article, an officer of the court lawyer is to serve the purpose of law, i.e. “justice,” 
and hence to act in “public interest.”). 
45. Demers, The Continuum of Professionalism, supra note 44, at 319; Robert Bell & 
Caroline Abela, A Lawyer’s Duty to the Court, ADVOC. SOC’Y J. 1, 4 (Jan. 2009), 
http://www.advocates.ca/assets/files/pdf/bibliography/Duty_to_Court.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 
2016) (citing Gavin MacKenzie, The Ethics of Advocacy, ADVOC. SOC’Y J. 26-27 (Sept. 2008) 
(stating that a lawyer’s duty to the court and to the client are equally important)).  Bell and Abela 
similarly state that “[w]hile facing financial and competitive pressures, lawyers must fulfil and 
balance their duties to the client, opposing counsel, the administration of justice and society.”  Id. 
at 1. 
46. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1643. 
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In addition, strong proponents of ZA assume that a lawyer’s duty to the 
client should not be subject to his or her duty to the court.47  For example, 
McGillivray states that” [t]his is the essence of neutral [zealous] lawyering 
– to have no interest other than those of the client and to prefer those 
interests above all others.”48  Therefore, it appears there is no legal limit 
placed on lawyers representing a client with zeal.  In fact, this notion is 
more popular and common than the previous notion.49  Patterson posits that 
“[t]he prevailing notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty 
of loyalty to the client is the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only 
duty of the lawyer.”50  Glendon expresses a similar theory that “[l]awyers to 
the interest of the client not to the law” and “[t]he only duty of the lawyers 
to be loyal to the client.”51 
Given the nature of the legal profession, attempting to balancing these 
two duties may make the situation more complicated.  The “objective-
partisan assumption” may be, at best, presumably based on a second theory 
that to balance these two duties, lawyers can identify a line, if there is one, 
or in the absence of such a line, draw one between the interest of the client 
and the interest of justice.52  Perlman explains that the balancing theory 
creates “difficulty identifying the line between permissible and 
impermissible advocacy and that compliance with the dominant view will 
result in misconduct more often than dominant-view proponents 
acknowledge.”53 
It seems that those assuming such are not aware of the catalysts that 
control the lawyers’ behavior, and this unawareness leads to a groundless 
theory.  Perlman’s research convincingly depicts the immense influence of 
 
47. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. 
REV. 669, 673 (1978) (“When acting as an advocate for a client according to the Principle of 
Professionalism, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means 
used or the ends achieved.”). 
48.  Anne McGillivray, ‘He Would Have Made a Wonderful Solicitor’: Law, Modernity and 
Professionalism in Bram Stoker’s Dracula, in LAWYERS AND VAMPIRES: CULTURAL HISTORIES 
OF LEGAL PROFESSIONS 225, 247 (W. Wesley Pue & David Sugarman eds., 2003). 
49.  Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 40 (1989). 
50. L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909, 
918 (1980). 
51. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 60 (1996); see also McGillivray, supra note 
48, at 247 (stating the essence of the zealous layering is that “to have no interest other than those 
of the client and to prefer those interests above all others”). 
52. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1646 (referring to WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF 
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (1998) in stating that “[t]he problem is that 
Simon assumes that lawyers are capable of making objective assessments about whether their 
conduct is consistent with the legal culture’s understanding of justice”). 
53. Id. at 1641. 
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partisanship, the prime derivative of ZA, on lawyers’ capabilities to make 
justifiable decisions.54  He shows that partisanship, or the lawyer’s zeal to 
his or her client, affects the lawyer’s perception.55  It can be argued that a 
lawyer, irrespective of the demands of justice, perceives only those points 
favorable to his or her client.56  On the other hand, lawyers are likely to 
disregard valid claims of the opposing party because of their partisanship.57  
Perlman asserts that the explanation behind such distortion of perception is 
that: 
[P]artisanship itself is a situational force capable of distorting a 
professional’s perceptions, including judgments relating to legal 
compliance. . . . So when we are placed in partisan roles, we tend 
to filter information in ways that support that conclusion (i.e., the 
conclusion favoring our clients).  This effect complicates our 
ability to make objective decisions, such as determining whether 
our clients are complying with existing legal requirements. . . . 
This effect is even stronger when people’s sense of identity and 
self-worth is tied to their partisan stances.58 
Thus, the argument is that a partisan lawyer is completely unable to 
identify, or draw a line between his or her two key roles.  This inability 
places a lawyer “at a heightened risk of engaging in impermissible 
behavior”59 and in a position prone to “make mistakes when determining 
what is lawful, thus increasing the risk of crossing the line between 
permissible and impermissible behavior.”60 
Apart from this, there are other catalysts that prevent lawyers from 
taking balanced steps to serve the interests of the client and of the law at the 
same time.  As previously discussed in the rebuttal to the first theory, 
economic factors influence the market for legal practice because “the 
practice of law is not apart from the economy.”61  Economic pressure, 
 
54. See generally id. at 1651-57. 
55. Id. 
56. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1654, 1657 (stating that lawyers’ self-esteem and identity are so 
intertwined with client-favorable outcomes that these lawyers may find it more difficult to assess 
information that tends to undermine their clients’ positions); John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical 
Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 55, 57 (2013) (“[T]he 
very nature of lawyering encourages lawyers to interpret ethical rules to their benefit.”). 
57. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21-22.  This phenomenon is known as “reactive 
devaluation,” the effect of which is that “[w]e do not hear the validity of a claim or argument or 
offer made by ‘the other side’ simply because it comes from the other side.”  Id. at 22 n.78. 
58. Perlman, supra note 7, at 1655-56. 
59. Id. at 1644. 
60. Id. at 1661. 
61. Hadfield, supra note 7, at 956. 
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especially in liberal and self-regulating markets, contaminates a lawyer’s 
decision-making ability and judgment which leads to his or her boundless 
commitment to the client.62  Thus, at any cost, the lawyer attempts to win 
the case for his or her client which may involve sacrificing his or her 
commitment to justice or to the law.63  “[W]inning at all costs” is a 
concomitant of ZA which deludes a lawyer into believing that he or she is 
under a duty to further the unjustifiable interest of his or her client.64  In 
addition, the intrinsic desire of human beings to succeed also drives a 
lawyer to only further his or her client’s cause because, in the market of the 
legal practice, the success of a lawyer is not measured in the balance of 
justice, but by “money, prestige, and status.”65 
However, the author believes that there is no practical necessity to 
balance these two key roles as it is going to be seen that a lawyer’s duty to 
the law is unquestionably superior to the duty to the client.  Possibly, the 
client supremacy or the ambiguity regarding the supremacy of roles is 
fabricated and intentional.  Promoters of this theory, especially lawyers, 
intentionally nourish the dispute making it convenient to be more client 
centered, while being less accountable to the system.66  There are instances 
in which lawyers use the ZA model as a shield to defend violations of the 
professional code of conduct.67  In addition, public misconception and 
exaggerated depictions of extreme zeal in the media and literature have 
made the lawyer’s role more complicated.68  Yet, it has been established 
that serving the law to uphold justice is the lawyers’ prime duty, whereas 
the duty to the client is second.69  Supremacy of law has been best 
explained as follows: 
 
62. Id; Perlman, supra note 7, at 1661. 
63.  Hadfield, supra note 7, at 1000. 
64. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8 (“If a lawyer sees their role as that of ‘winning at all 
costs’ [in fact, ZA shows the same] and they have little in the way of valid or strong logical 
argument with which to do so, or believe that bad argument will be more effective than good in 
convincing judge or jury, then they could come to believe that they have a responsibility to utilize 
such bad reasoning.  Such logically bad reasoning could be instrumentally or functionally good 
reasoning from their perspective, or that of their clients.”). 
65. Susan Swaim Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers 
Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-
Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 567 (1998). 
66. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 40  (“Indeed, the image of the lawyer as loyal advocate for the 
beleaguered client is perpetuated by the bar itself. . . .”). 
67.  See generally Adam Owen Glist, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the 
Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 767, 769, 775-78 (2000). 
68. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 40 (“More familiar to the public, and more comfortable to 
lawyers, is the model of the lawyer as a ‘zealous advocate,’ the devoted champion of the client’s 
cause . . . and reinforced by the media, in literature, and in common lore.”). 
69. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8; Dzienkowski, supra note 56, at 75 (“[T]he duty of 
zeal should not be allowed to be a justification for lawyer behavior that imposes significant costs 
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[The advocate] has a duty to the court which is paramount. It is a 
mistake to suppose that he is the mouthpiece of his client to say 
what he wants or his tool to do what he directs.  He is none of 
these things. He owes allegiance to a higher cause.  It is the cause 
of truth and justice. . . . He must disregard the most specific 
instructions of his client if they conflict with his duty to the 
court.70 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated: 
An attorney owes his first duty to the court.  He assumed his 
obligations toward it before he ever had a client.  His oath requires 
him to be absolutely honest even though his client’s interests may 
seem to require a contrary course.  The lawyers cannot serve two 
masters; and the one they have undertaken to serve primarily is the 
court.71 
Even Freedman, one of the strongest advocates of ZA,72 never denies 
the supremacy of lawyers’ duty to justice; instead, he believes that there is a 
lawful limit to ZA.73  While providing that a lawyer should take whatever 
measures are required to “vindicate a client’s cause,” the ABA rules also 
provide that the measures must be “lawful and ethical.”74 
Moreover, some research that considers lawyers to be agents of either 
the court or the client, also confirms the supremacy of law.  For example, 
Gaetke believes that a lawyer, as an officer of the court, is in fact an agent 
of the court, or more broadly of the judicial system.75  On the other hand, 
Daniel states that “[t]he lawyer-client relationship is one species of the 
 
on the legal system and society in general.”); Bell & Abela, supra note 45, at 3 (“[A] lawyer may 
not be able to act in a way that serves the client’s best interests if doing so would put the 
administration of justice and the community’s confidence in the profession at risk.”); G.T. Pagone, 
The Advocate’s Duty to the Court in Adversarial Proceedings (July 23, 2008), 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/VicJSchol/2008/10.pdf (citing Giannarelli v. Wraith, 165 
CLR 543, 556-57 (1988) (confirming that barristers do have a duty to the administration of law 
that goes beyond the duty to the client); Luban, supra note 18, at 677 (depicting Wendel’s belief 
that lawyers’ “accountability runs to the law, not to individuals”). 
70. HEAD & MANN, supra note 17, at 8 (citing Rondel v. Worsley (1967) 1 QB 443, 502). 
71. JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN & LAWRENCE SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF 
EVIDENCE 254 (1995) (citing In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass’n, 275 NW 265, 268 (Neb. 
1937). 
72.  Freedman’s overwhelming support for ZA is best depicted by his statement saying, “[l]et 
justice be done—that is, for my client let justice be done—though the heavens fall.”  MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9 (1975). 
73. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2, at 1320. 
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
75. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 43. 
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broad agent-principal relationship.”76  At the outset, it may seem that, in 
terms of supremacy, Daniel and Gaetke have opposite positions.  Indeed, 
their positions differ as to whether the lawyer is the agent of the client or 
the system, but this does not necessarily mean that there is confusion as to 
which duty a lawyer shall perform.  Either way, a lawyer must follow 
agency law, and even if acting as the client’s agent, the lawyer’s actions are 
subject to legal standards.77 
Similarly, historical accounts of this issue support the presumption that 
a lawyer’s duty to either the court or the system is never subordinate to his 
or her duty to the client.  For example, Gaetke shows that historically 
lawyers have been servants of the law.78  In fact, the client supremacy 
theory is historically boosted by a famous statement in the 1820s Queen 
Caroline’s Case,79 claiming that in order to save the client, a lawyer can do 
whatever he or she wants.80  However, another scholar, Wendel, believes 
that this statement has no general applicability because it was a mere 
political threat and “was never intended as maxim of legal ethics.”81  
Further, two additional scholars, Zacharias and Green, claim that 
Brougham, the author of Queen Caroline’s Case, repudiated the statement 
on the ground that it was not deliberate.82  “In 1859, Brougham described 
his famous speech as ‘anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered 
opinion.’”83  Even Freedman, who considers Zacharias, Green, and Smith’s 
claims of Brougham’s repudiation to be false, admits that Brougham never 
intended to mean that lawyers who exercise zeal can cross the limit of the 
law.84  Freedman further acknowledges that “neither Brougham nor anyone 
 
76.  Josiah M. Daniel, A Proposed Definition of the Term “Lawyering”, 101 LAW LIBR. J. 
207, 213 (2009); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1107, 1128 (2013) (finding the same relationship). 
77.  Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 73, 83 (2007) 
(“[L]awyers arguably are just clients’ agents, in a strictly legal sense, and should act in accordance 
with common law agency principles.”). 
78. Gaetke, supra note 49, at 42 n.12 (citing G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 28-29 
(2d ed. 1920) (stating that lawyers seem to be “[s]ervants at law of our Lord the King”)). 
79. See Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2. 
80. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham-Advocating at the Edge for Human Rights, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2007). 
81. W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1, 60 n.205 (1999). 
82. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and Well-
Considered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1221 (2006). 
83. Tom Smith, Zealous Advocates: The Historical Foundations of the Adversarial Criminal 
Defense Lawyer, LAW, CRIME AND HISTORY 1, 10 (2012), 
http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/29074/1/Zealous_Advocates_The_Historical_Foundat.pdf. 
84. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, supra note 2. 
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else has ever suggested that there are no lawful limits on zealous 
advocacy.”85 
C.  THEORY NUMBER THREE: THE OPPOSITIONAL  PRESENTATION 
 MECHANISM IS THE BEST WAY TO  REVEAL THE TRUTH 
In order to ensure justice, the fundamental and comprehensive 
requirement is that the judgment must be founded on complete and definite 
presentation of fact so that the truth is discovered.86  Defenders of ZA 
assume that when two opposing parties speak, truth is revealed.87  They 
claim that the Oppositional Presentation Mechanism (“OPM”) enables a 
lawyer to employ, with extreme zeal, his or her skills, knowledge, and 
tricks to destroy the credibility of the information and evidence produced by 
opposing counsel.88  As a result, only true information and evidence 
prevails, leading to an accurate decision.89  Some scholars believe that the 
OPM decision is accurate because it enables the tribunal to receive a 
complete account of the dispute, which “leads to a better evidentiary 
record.”90  Further, these scholars believe that the competition generated by 
the OPM “improve[s] the quality of information presented” by vigorously 
attacking the unreliable information.91  Moreover, the OPM has been 
considered a modern “bloodless” battle and has been said to replace 
traditional bloody combat.92  This theory is explained as follows: 
The adversary system proceeds from the assumption that the most 
effective way to determine truth and to do justice is to pit against 
each other two advocates, two adversaries, each with the 
responsibility to marshal all of the relevant facts, authorities, and 
policy considerations on each side of the case, and to present those 
conflicting views in a clash before an impartial arbiter.  In the 
performance of that adversarial role, zealous advocacy is, of 
 
85. Id. 
86.  Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 316-17 (stating that “receiving a complete account of 
dispute” or enabling the court to get the truth behind the dispute leads to accurate adjudication).  
For the purpose of this Article, it is supposed that the identification of the truth is the prerequisite 
for ensuring justice. 
87. Thurman, supra note 7, at 8. 
88.  Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 317–18. 
89. Id. (stating that “[t]he lawyer’s zeal ensures that motivation is high, and competition from 
the opposing counsel checks potential excesses and ensures that each party’s increased effort 
enhances rather than impairs the accuracy of adjudication”). 
90. Id. at 316. 
91. Id. at 316–17. 
92. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21. 
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course, an essential element in producing an effective clash of 
opposite views.93 
Like the two previous theories, it can be argued that this theory is also 
incorrect because the product of the OPM, belligerent lawyers, negatively 
affects the whole system.  The combative and aggressive nature of the OPM 
is said to be responsible for the deterioration of the legal profession.94  This 
is explained as the “unrestrained competitiveness driven by an obsessive 
desire to win and a compulsive fear of losing.”95  The weakest point of this 
theory is that it is designed to work in a binary oppositional world; 
however, the binary oppositional model cannot correctly explain the 
world.96  This theory can be explained as follows: 
Binary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the 
best way for us to learn the truth; polarized debate distorts the 
truth, leaves out -important information, simplifies complexity, 
and obfuscates rather than clarifies.  More significantly, some 
matters-mostly civil, but occasionally even criminal, cases-are not 
susceptible to a binary (i.e., right/wrong, win/lose) conclusion or 
solution.97 
Menkel-Meadow specifically and persuasively demonstrates that the 
OPM distorts truth.98  Many others similarly observe that the OPM 
“increase[s] confusion,”99 “retards discovery of truths,”100 and encourages 
 
93. Freedman, Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers’ Advocacy?, supra note 22. 
94.  Steve C Briggs, The Myth and the Mischief of Zealous Advocacy, 34 THE COLO. 
LAWYER 33, 34 (2005), http://coloradomentoring.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Briggs-S-The-
Myth-and-Mischief-of-Zealous-Advocacy-34-The-Colorado-Lawyer-33-2005.pdf. 
95.  Briggs, supra note 94, at 33 (citing Michael Josephson, Ethics Beyond the Code, Speech 
at the Colorado Bar Association Annual Meeting (Sept. 1994)). 
96. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 6. 
97. Id.  Similarly, Thurman states that the model dissembles, distorts, and subordinates truth 
to winning.  Thurman, supra note 7, at 19. 
98. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 21–22 (observing that the OPM distorts the truth “by 
making extreme claims, by avoiding any potentially ‘harmful’ facts, by refusing to acknowledge 
any truth in the opposition,” by limiting storytelling to two, rather than allowing for a multiplicity 
of stories, by refusing to share information, or, conversely, by strategically giving or demanding 
too much information, “by manipulating information (as in the ‘battle of experts’), by making the 
true look false (cross-examining a truthful witness) or the false look true (by offering false or 
misleading evidence or by actively ‘coaching’ witnesses).”); Asimow & Weisberg, supra note 2, 
at 243 (“The present system, of course, strongly motivates lawyers to avoid finding out the truth 
and encourages smart clients to lie to their lawyers.”). 
99. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 317. 
100. Id. (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN 
JUSTICE: (1947)); Briggs, supra note 94, at 34; A. Kenneth Pye, The Role of Counsel in the 
Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L. J. 921–59 (1978) (discussing how defense counsel in 
criminal cases may suppress the truth). 
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many lawyers “to subvert our adversary system into a mechanism for . . . 
subverting justice, and treating others with incivility.”101 
Most of the OPM loopholes become visible when one side of the 
conflict has superior access to advice.  Even the strong supporters of the 
OPM acknowledge that when one party has superior access to legal advice 
“competitive presentation does not invariably prevent or correct 
inaccuracy.”102  They believe that “imbalances may have harmful or 
doubtful effects, particularly because they increase the ability of the more 
knowledgeable party to present false or prejudicial information and to 
impose costs on her opponent.”103  Despite their unadorned response, 
supporters do not accept the shortcomings of OPM; instead, they believe 
that the accounts against OPM are “partial and simplistic.”104  This position 
is reconfirmed in demanding that: 
[W]hile advice has many disturbing or ambiguous informational 
effects, on balance providing litigation advice to one or both 
parties will generally increase the information reaching tribunals 
and improve the capacity of tribunals to determine who deserves to 
be sanctioned and who does not.105 
The supporters of the OPM believe that the accounts criticizing it 
unjustifiably evaluate the importance of the OPM by placing excessive 
emphasis on the cases with one party having superior access to advice or 
information; the accounts, as they believe, consider only those cases in 
which parties have unequal access to advice.106  Generally, parties have 
equal access to advice; the incidents of unequal access are exceptions.107  
While people tend to present favorable information and suppress 
unfavorable information, lawyers are generally competent enough to “detect 
and sanction opponent suppression.”108 
However, this theory appears to be incorrect because in the discussion 
of the first theory, it was depicted that parties are generally not on equal 
footing because of parties’ inability to hire lawyers of equal competence.  In 
reality, parties will never be on equal footing.  Aside from a lawyer’s 
competence in presenting and suppressing information, the ability of a 
client or witness to present or suppress information and their ability to 
 
101.  Briggs, supra note 94, at 34. 
102. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 318. 
103. Id. at 319. 
104. Id. at 318. 
105. Id. at 319. 
106. Id. at 318. 
107. Id. 
108. Bundy & Elhauge, supra note 3, at 415. 
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successfully defend cross-examination also makes a significant difference.  
For example, suppose that the victim in case number one can afford to be 
represented by the highest quality lawyer, whereas the accused is only 
represented by an average lawyer.  Here, the accused will present less 
favorable information than the victim. 
Finally, it is worth noting that “[p]erhaps the distortions of modern 
verbal combat have outlived their usefulness and we can evolve to the next 
level-a combat-less legal system.”109 
D. THEORY NUMBER FOUR: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO  ZEALOUS 
 ADVOCACY 
ZA is considered fundamental or cornerstone to the adversary 
system.110  The survival of the adversary system is predominantly 
dependent on the theory that to ensure justice, the adversary model coupled 
with ZA is best suited to the purpose and there is no alternative to the 
unique companion that can replace either of these two.  Even Menkel-
Meadow, who is completely aware of the serious drawbacks of ZA, is 
afraid of the probable risks involved in the alternative models.111  The 
theory is justified on the grounds that the unique companion is best suited to 
the survival and prosperity of democracy and to the question of ensuring the 
most appropriate and effective remedy.112 
Those who believe this theory also believe that lawyers are the most 
important democratic role players or political agents; the guardians of 
democracy.113  Lawyers can best play this political role when ZA is in 
place.  In fact, zealousness is considered as “the foundation of some of the 
most important values in our system of government.”114  Zealous advocates 
play this important role in two ways.  First, advocates provide legal services 
to everyone irrespective of whether the client is guilty or innocent.115  
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Second, advocates prevent the government from exercising coercive 
practices or, at least, by making the government responsible for its actions 
in court.116 
“Lawyers represent both sides in a controversy regardless of whether 
one side is ‘good’ or the other ‘bad.’”117  Referring to the democratic role of 
the lawyers, one scholar posits that it is the constitutional duty of the lawyer 
to represent the accused.118  The whole concept is that everyone has a 
constitutional right to be represented to ensure justice for all.119  Lawyers 
are responsible for ensuring “true equality before the law” and “for the state 
to be subject to the ordinary law of land.”120  Similarly, the system 
empowers “one or more citizens to call the government itself before the bar 
of justice.”121  A threat to ZA would be against both civil liberties and the 
public interest.122 
The basis of the theory that lawyers are democratic role players lies in 
the political and judicial conditions of the period when ZA was in the 
introduction and development process.  “Dangerous social and political 
unrest”123 and excessive government interference in the administration of 
justice contributed to the creation of ZA.124  ZA is justified because it 
originated during a time when various troubling elements in the 
administration of justice were underplayed.  In particular, the government 
“would often target the vulnerable, fabricate offences, bring a prosecution 
and reap the rewards of a wrongful conviction.”125  This is nicely depicted 
as follows: 
[T]he importance of the ‘full defence’ principle clearly emerged in 
reaction to the substantial flaws evident in the criminal justice 
system: the systematic abuse and repression of the rights of 
prisoners, the one-sided nature of criminal trials in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries; the exploitation of prosecution for profit 
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by thief-takers and solicitors . . . it appeared that a ‘full defense’ 
was required to remedy these issues.126 
Based on this assertion, “graymail” is justified,127 though, it is likely 
most important when there is a repressive government.128  When the 
circumstances are stable and peaceful, graymail may have little importance; 
instead, in sensitive cases, it may be harmful.129  In fact, where judicial 
independence is guaranteed, there is only a slight possibility that the 
government may interfere with the administration of justice.130  
Furthermore, the author observes that in most cases, politics has no direct 
connection to the subject matter of the case and the number of cases in 
which the accused is charged based on a political motive is limited.  
Therefore, in scenario number one, exercising zeal against the victim will 
likely prevent justice rather than promote it. 
In addition, the claim that no other system is as effective as ZA’s 
embedded adversary system in “protecting individual dignity and 
autonomy,”131 is incorrect as it is established that the proper application of 
alternative models, like the investigatory model, ensures more protection.132  
There are other systems like “[t]he inquisitorial system of civil law 
countries, the mediation of Asian countries, the dispute resolution processes 
of Native Americans, and the ‘moots’ of some African cultures” and these 
systems each have “something to teach us.”133 
On the other hand, the theory that zeal ensures the best remedy is the 
by-product of the OPM.  It has already been observed that the OPM, as 
theorists claim, enable the tribunal to receive a complete account of the 
dispute and “enhances rather than impairs the accuracy of adjudication.”134  
Eventually, theorists claim an accurate adjudication leads to an accurate 
remedy.  However, from the beginning, the theory proves to be wrong 
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because it has already been revealed in the discussion of the third theory 
that the OPM does not necessarily enhance the accuracy of adjudication. 
Furthermore, since ZA tends to be based on negative qualities such as 
distrust,135 hostility,136 and combativeness, it may, at best, give a conflict 
time remedy.  This kind of remedy is exclusionary,137 reactive,138 and 
unaccommodating.  These shortcomings are equally observable in practice.  
In cases involving issues such as divorce, guardianship, and estates the 
exclusionary model destroys the likelihood of reaching to an 
accommodating solution.139  The devastating effect of the exclusionary 
model can be explained as follows: 
[T]he adversary process infuses the parties with the same spirit of 
adverseness and depersonalization . . . it can also serve to 
deteriorate the parties’ underlying relationship.  A graphic example 
regularly occurs in divorce law.  Many a couple reconciled to 
separation has been driven to hostility by the maximum demands 
asserted by their spouse’s lawyer.  The typical response is: “If 
(s)he’s going to try to wipe me out, then I’m going to fight over 
the kids.”140 
Thus, the negative characteristics of ZA close the doors to mutual 
understanding, cooperation, and compromise, which are prerequisites for an 
equally beneficial solution to each party.141  However, “[l]itigation is often 
unnecessary and potentially destructive.”142  Unfortunately, ZA does not 
leave any space for this realization because a remedy is only accurate when 
filtered through combat involving lawyers.  As a result, ZA destroys the 
option of settling a legal dispute more effectively without involving costly, 
time consuming, and stressful litigation.  This is why ZA might “cultivate 
evil.”143 
It has become clear that none of the theories are correct on which the 
grand theory depends (i.e., that ZA is the best model).  Therefore, it appears 
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that the theory claiming the immense importance of lawyers in protecting 
democratic values in every case is an exaggeration, and the theory 
predicting the best remedy is not well-grounded.  In addition, even from the 
stakeholder’s perspective, i.e., lawyers, clients, and society, the ZA model 
has substantial drawbacks.  For example, in 1993, a Legal System 
Dynamics Subcommittee of the Professionalism Committee, reported that 
zealousness is responsible for the increased lack of professionalism among 
lawyers.144  The reality is that ZA is being used as a shield to justify 
negative characteristics of the legal practice, such as paranoia, 
deceitfulness, insensitivity, and the utmost desire to promote the client’s 
interest regardless of whether it is justified.145  Therefore, should ZA be 
continued in its current form, “lawyer[s] will be encouraged to be 
competitive rather than cooperative; aggressive rather than accommodating; 
ruthless rather than compassionate; and pragmatic rather than 
principled.”146 
III.  LOOKING FOR REFORM IN THE ZA MODEL AND  BEYOND 
“Adversarialism is so powerful a heuristic and organizing framework 
for our culture, that, much like a great whale, it seems to swallow up any 
effort to modify or transform it.”147  It is apparent, however, that the ocean 
of theories in which the “great whale” lives has been dried out.  For 
example, scholars have already begun to realize the necessity of alternative 
models.148  Realizing the necessity of modification, the adversary system 
“must constantly be reexamined and defined in the light of today’s 
world.”149  Reform in the traditional ZA model is inevitable because it has 
become outdated compared to the “many functions of a modern lawyer.”150  
Even strong supporters of ZA acknowledge the importance of its 
reformation: 
We do need reform.  We need reform to make the adversary 
system function better, to inform people about their rights and 
about how to vindicate them, to ensure effective representation on 
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both sides of every case, and to provide competent judges in all 
cases.151 
Thus, it is well-grounded and timely to demand the reevaluation of ZA 
in the guarantee of justice.  In fact, scholars, ranging from strong critiques 
to strong supporters of ZA, have already started to prescribe measures 
required to deal with the shortcomings of ZA.  Strong critiques of ZA 
suggest that lawyers should essentially look at the interest of law, and, to 
this end, ZA needs to be replaced by other appropriate models.152  One such 
critique prescribes that lawyers should not even take on a case when 
denying the case is better for the society or when it is apparent that the 
client may use the lawyer’s skill to do harm.153  Similarly, Professor 
Wendel opines that lawyers should not represent all causes of a client, even 
if permitted to do so by law.154  Instead, lawyers should only pursue client’s 
substantiated “legal entitlements.”155 
Conversely, supporters of weak adversarialism believe that ZA should 
remain in action to the extent that it serves justice.  One scholar, William 
Simon, suggests a discretionary model where the issue of advancing a 
client’s unjustified claim is left to the discretion of the lawyer,156 expecting 
the lawyer to exercise discretion to promote justice.157  In contrast, 
however, other scholars, Asimow and Weisberg, take slightly different 
positions, desiring a compromise between strong and weak 
adversarialism.158  According to their prescribed model, a defense attorney 
must not perform at his or her best unless the defendant is subject to “wildly 
excessive punishment,” and then a “full-throttle” defense is permitted.159 
However, when considering different facts in different cases, there is 
no justification for viewing all cases from the same point of view, because 
legal problems and remedies in two cases are never the same.  The same 
rationale applies in that the amount of zeal required in a criminal case is not 
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the same amount required in a civil case.160  It is also important to note that 
ZA may have importance in some cases, yet obstruct the path of justice in 
other cases.161  Therefore, it would be a mistake to believe that a single 
model, such as extreme ZA, weak adversarialism, or balanced ZA, alone, 
would effectively solve all problems.162  There is no reason to prescribe the 
same antibiotic for all kinds of bacteria; rather, different antibiotics, in 
different dosages are to be administered to deal with different types of 
bacteria.  In order to ensure justice and effectively and appropriately deal 
with legal problems, all models should be taken into account and then the 
best suited model should be applied.163  For example, the multi-story-telling 
model should be applied when appropriate, “permit[ing] more voices, more 
stories, more complex versions of reality to inform us and to allow all 
people to express views that are not determined entirely by their ‘given’ 
cultural identities.”164  This model may provide the best solution in cases 
relating to comparative negligence or business necessity defenses.165 
The author believes that in its extreme form, traditional ZA may be 
used in cases with powerful parties, like multinational corporations, states, 
political parties, or other entities that can influence the outcome of trial on 
the prosecution side, and thus, may pose a threat to democratic and political 
values.  In such cases, there may be political lawyers who deal with cases 
involving states or other politically influential parties.  This kind of lawyer 
will likely have the privilege of doing whatever he or she wants to serve the 
client’s interests, and will be the only lawyer allowed to resort to extreme 
zeal. 
In other cases, however, ZA may be applied if modified.  For example, 
in the “Damini Rape Case,”166 a main point was that one of the five 
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defendants was a minor who required special protection under juvenile 
law.167  In a case in which the accused and the victim are vulnerable, 
modified or weak ZA may be used.  The accused gets the benefit of ZA in 
the sense that the defense attorneys exercise zeal in the client’s interest but 
will not “actively mislead the court”168 or attack on the victim.  Instead of 
exposing victims to the harsh behavior of defense attorneys, he or she may 
be separately cross-examined to ensure comfortability and privacy.  
Alternatively, to avoid gender-based discomfort, this type of case may be 
tried jointly by a team of male and female judges.169  In addition, the impact 
of cross-examining a female victim by a female lawyer in front of a female 
judge may be considered. 
In cases with a number of aggrieved parties, an inquisitorial system is 
more and appropriate than an adversarial system.  Therefore, cases 
involving issues of mass justice, such as environmental and consumer 
litigation, or personal injury claims arising from industrial disease, may be 
solved under the inquisitorial system.  One model, largely influenced by the 
inquisitorial system, suggests: 
Under such a model the “judge” would assume a much more active 
role with respect to the course of the hearing; for example, he 
would examine the parties, might call his own experts if needed, 
request that certain types of evidence be presented, and, if 
necessary, aid the parties in acquiring that evidence.170 
Farrow proposes another model which, at the outset, seems absurd and 
whimsical, but it may work well if applied to cases related to the dissolution 
of marriage, settling a guardianship issue, divorce, or partition.  Under this 
proposal, the lawyer takes on all clients, and instead of pursuing their 
unjustified causes, he or she will later try to convince the client to pursue 
the justified cause.171 
To find an effective remedy to mitigate the impact of the differences 
opposing lawyers face in skill or capacity, one scholar wittily asks, “Should 
we assign lawyers to cases on a random or lottery basis?”172  Inspired by 
this question, the author would like to imagine a model that may be applied 
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when there is a lesser possibility of abuse by the lawyers.  Accordingly, 
lawyers would not choose the client, instead a lawyer or government 
association would distribute the cases blindly to lawyers who would be 
required to defend their client to the greatest extent permitted by law.  Then, 
a ranking would be made based on the success rate of each lawyer.  A 
lawyer would then have the option to reject a case if it was found to be 
meritless; thus, contributing to the success rate.  Upon rejection, other 
lawyers, at their discretion, would be permitted to take the case at their own 
risk of reducing the success rate.  If the new lawyer succeeds, the lawyer 
who rejected the case would be discredited.  In response, however, the 
question must be raised as to the clients’ freedom to choose desired counsel, 
because a client may not be comfortable with sharing his or her case with 
all lawyers.  In that situation, a client may be asked to provide a list of 
acceptable lawyers, and then, one lawyer from the list may be assigned. 
In addition to classifying cases and selecting different models, the 
author is of the opinion that some ground rules should be set and followed, 
with violations leading to punishment including disbarring the violating 
lawyer.  For example, in all cases, no lawyer should be allowed to willfully 
deny the points of law brought forth by opposing counsel, because the 
denial is disgraceful to the spirit of law.173  The following suggestion may 
be taken as an important ground rule.  “Instead of attempting to destroy the 
testimony it would be better to refrain from impeaching the truthful witness 
and to trust the trier of fact to draw the right conclusions.”174  An additional 
ground rule may be that “[a] lawyer should not unreasonably raise or defend 
an action for which there is no legal justification.”175  Also, there is a 
necessity to set ground rules to prohibit lawyers’ rude, harsh, and 
aggressive behavior in the courtroom.176  Lawyers may be required to 
receive more training, counseling, and to pass advanced eligibility exams so 
that it is ensured that they can technically, rationally, and gently without 
stigmatizing the victim, bring out the truth. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Rabbi Harold L. Kudan states: “[t]hat which dominates our imagination 
and our daily thoughts will determine our life and character.  Therefore, it 
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behooves us to be careful what we are worshipping, for what we are 
worshipping we are becoming.”177  Understandably, in the ZA context, 
Kudan’s statement is correct.  Despite having no conclusive justification, 
ZA dictates our consciousness, our minds, and our actions because we 
worship it.  We worship ZA because we assume that the exclusionary 
model is best to deal with all types of legal problems.  Until a system is 
proven groundless, meritless, ineffective, less effective, or prejudicial, there 
is nothing wrong with worshiping or having faith in any system; it is instead 
required for the functioning of that system.  However, as argued in this 
Article, the underlying theories of ZA are groundless and sometimes the 
system gives rise to prejudicial decisions in pursuit of justice; therefore, 
there is no reason to worship or stick to ZA as a solution to all legal 
problems.  Instead, it is more appropriate to believe that, in addition to ZA, 
there are other options.  Bearing in mind there are variations in the nature, 
context, subject-matter, and remedy sought in legal problems, all options 
should be examined so that the best suited models for a particular type of 
legal problem can be identified. 
To this end, extensive engineering is required to deal with legal 
problems of a different nature; a series of analytical works from the micro 
level, instead of macro level, are urgently required.  As explained in 
previous sections of this Article, different models, questions, hypotheses, 
and possibilities may be explored.  It is then necessary to conduct an 
extensive study on each of these models in relation to the different types of 
cases.  All of the alternative systems must be put on trial to determine 
which mechanism produces the most appropriate remedy for a particular 
kind of case by introducing a scientific trial and error mechanism.  Like the 
periodical table of elements used by a chemist, a lawyer may need to 
maintain a detailed chart or database enlisting the wide variety of 
circumstances and factors related to legal problems.  Like a microbiologist 
who conducts his or her research deep into the microscopic details of a cell, 
a legal scholar must enter into the hair-splitting details of the human mind 
to ascertain responses in different circumstances and to identify the 
elements that affect those responses. 
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